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Abstract—The alternating direction method of multipliers
(ADMM) has been recently recognized as a promising optimizer
for large-scale machine learning models. However, there are very
few results studying ADMM from the aspect of communication
costs, especially jointly with privacy preservation, which are
critical for distributed learning. We investigate the communi-
cation efficiency and privacy-preservation of ADMM by solving
the consensus optimization problem over decentralized networks.
Since walk algorithms can reduce communication load, we first
propose incremental ADMM (I-ADMM) based on the walk
algorithm, the updating order of which follows a Hamiltonian
cycle instead. However, I-ADMM cannot guarantee the privacy
for agents against external eavesdroppers even if the randomized
initialization is applied. To protect privacy for agents, we then
propose two privacy-preserving incremental ADMM algorithms,
i.e., PI-ADMM1 and PI-ADMM2, where perturbation over step
sizes and primal variables is adopted, respectively. Through
theoretical analyses, we prove the convergence and privacy
preservation for PI-ADMM1, which are further supported by
numerical experiments. Besides, simulations demonstrate that the
proposed PI-ADMM1 and PI-ADMM2 algorithms are commu-
nication efficient compared with state-of-the-art methods.
Index Terms—Decentralized optimization; alternating direc-
tion method of multipliers (ADMM); privacy preservation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a decentralized network G = (V, E), where V =
{1, ..., N} is the set of agents with computing capability, and E
is the set of links. G is connected and there is no center agent.
The agents seek to solve the consensus optimization problem
(1) collaboratively through sharing information among each
other,
min
x
N∑
i=1
fi(x;Di), (1)
where fi : Rp → R is the local function at agent i, and Di
is the private dataset at agent i. All agents share a common
optimization variable x ∈ Rp . The decentralized optimization
problem (1) is widely applied in many areas such as signal
processing [1]–[3], machine learning [4]–[6], wireless sensor
networks (WSNs) [7], [8] and smart grids [9]–[11], just to
name a few.
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In the existing literature, e.g., [11]–[18], a large number of
decentralized algorithms have been investigated to solve the
consensus problem (1). Typically, the algorithms can mainly be
classified into primal and primal-dual types, namely, gradient
descent based (GD) methods and the alternating direction
method of multipliers (ADMM) based methods, respectively.
In this work, we will use ADMM as the optimizer, which can
usually achieve more accurate consensus performance than GD
based methods with constant step size [18].
Though distributed gradient descent (DGD) [12], EXTRA
[13] and distributed ADMM (D-ADMM) [14] have good con-
vergence rates with respect to the number of iterations, these
algorithms require each agent to collect information from all
its neighbors. This makes the amount of communication high
for each iteration. Hence, for the applications with unstable
links among agents such as WSNs, the communication load
becomes one of the main bottlenecks. Moreover the straggler
problem is also pronounced in synchronous ADMM based
methods [16], where the total running time is significantly
increased due to slowly computing nodes. Besides, for the
ADMM based decentralized approaches provided in [14]–[18],
agents are required to exchange primal and dual variables with
neighbors in each iteration. This inevitably leads to the privacy
problem if the local function fi and data set Di are private to
agent i(∈ N), for instance, in the practical applications with
sensitive information such as personal medical or financial
records, confidential business notes and so on. Thus, guar-
anteeing privacy is critical for decentralized consensus.
A. Related Works
To reduce the communication load for solving consensus
problem (1), various decentralized approaches have been pro-
posed recently. Among these efforts, one important direction
is to limit information sharing for each iteration. In [19],
given an underlying graph, the weighted ADMM is developed
by deleting some links prior to the optimization process.
Communication-censored ADMM (COCA) in [20] can adap-
tively determine whether a message is informative during the
optimization process. Following COCA, an extreme scenario
is to only activate one link in the graph per iteration such as the
random-walk ADMM (W-ADMM) [17], which incrementally
updates the optimization variables. To achieve optimized trade-
off between communication cost and running time, parallel
random walk ADMM method (PW-ADMM) and intelligent
PW-ADMM (IPW-ADMM) are proposed in [18]. References
[21], [22] also take advantages of random walks but deal with
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2stochastic gradients. Another line of works is to exchange
sparse or quantized messages to transmit fewer bits. Following
this direction, the quantized ADMM is provided in [23].
Two quantized stochastic gradient descent (SGD) methods,
sign SGD with error-feedback (EF-SignSGD) and periodic
quantized averaging SGD (PQASGD), are proposed in [24]
and [25], respectively. Aji et al. [26] presented a heuristic
approach to truncate the smallest gradient components and
only communicate the remaining large ones. However, these
algorithms cannot guarantee exact convergence to the optimal
solution [27].
Meanwhile, with increasing concerns on data privacy, e.g.,
GDPR in Europe [28], more and more efforts are allocated
to developing privacy preserving algorithms for solving the
decentralized consensus problem (1). To measure the privacy
preserving performance, differential privacy has been used
[29]. In general, artificial uncertainty is introduced over shared
messages or local functions to maintain sensitive information
secure against eavesdroppers. Differential private distributed
algorithms based on GD have been presented in [30]–[32],
where noise following different distributions is added to vari-
able or gradients. Moreover, in primal-dual methods [33]–
[36], perturbation is conducted either on penalty term, or on
the primal and dual variables before sharing to neighboring
agents. On the other hand, cryptographic based methods,
such as (partial) homomorphic Encryption [37], [38], are also
adopted to protect the privacy of agents through applying
the encryption mechanism to exchanged information. Other
privacy-preserving approaches, including perturbing problems
or states, are provided in [39], [40]. However, these methods
lead to high computational overheads and communication load
especially in large-scale decentralized optimization.
B. Motivation and Contributions
W-ADMM can significantly reduce communication load
by activating only one node and link per iteration in a
successive manner. Since the sequence of the updating order
for agents is randomized by following a Markov chain, it is
possible that the primal and dual variables at some agents
are updated for much fewer rounds than others. Thus, the
convergence speed may degrade. To guarantee agents not to be
inactive for a long time, Random Walk with Choice (RWC) is
introduced in IPW-ADMM [18] to reduce running time. The
main principle of RWC is that through restricting the updating
order of agents, the convergence speed can be improved for
incremental approaches, which shall save communication load.
This phenomenon is also supported by the walk proximal
gradient (WPG) presented in [11], where the updating order
of agents follows a Hamiltonian Cycle. Therefore, in what
follows, we will fix the updating order of agents as WPG
and present the incremental ADMM (I-ADMM). Different
from WPG, the I-ADMM is a primal-dual based approach.
Moreover, comparing to PW-ADMM and IPW-ADMM, there
is only one walk with a fixed order in I-ADMM.
To enable the privacy preservation for I-ADMM against the
eavesdropper, which overhears all links in E, we introduce
uncertainty among local primal-dual variables and the trans-
mitted tokens, e.g., through adding artificial noise over primal
or dual variables [33], [35]. However, without scaling noise
with iterations, there exists an error bound at convergence [35],
which leads to a trade-off between privacy and accuracy. To
avoid compromising convergence performance, we propose to
perform perturbation over the step size for both updates of
primal and dual variables, i.e. {xi, yi}i∈V . Equivalently, this
procedure can be seen as adding noise, which is scaled by
the primal and dual residues, over xki and y
k
i , respectively for
iteration k.
Different from the existed results, in what follows, we will
study the ADMM based optimizer for solving (1) from the
aspect of both communication efficiency and privacy preserva-
tion. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized
as follows.
• We propose the I-ADMM method for solving decen-
tralized consensus optimization (1). Different from other
incremental ADMM methods such as W-ADMM [17],
the update order of I-ADMM follows a Hamiltonian
cycle, which can further reduce communication load and
improve the convergence speed.
• Since I-ADMM is not privacy-preserving, we first intro-
duce the randomized initialization. To guarantee privacy
preservation, we provide two privacy-preserving incre-
mental ADMM (PI-ADMM) algorithms, i.e., PI-ADMM1
and PI-ADMM2, which apply perturbation over step size
and primal variable, respectively. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper to consider privacy
preservation for incremental ADMM.
• We prove the convergence of PI-ADMM1, and show that
at convergence, the primal and dual variables generated
by PI-ADMM1 satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions with mild assumptions over local functions.
Besides, we prove that privacy preservation is guaranteed
against eavesdropper or colluding agents.
• Numerical results show that the proposed I-ADMM based
algorithms are communication efficient compared with
state-of-the-art methods. Moreover, we show that PI-
ADMM1 can guarantee both privacy-preservation and
accurate convergence.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first
introduce the incremental ADMM in Section II. To guarantee
the privacy of local agents against external eavesdroppers, we
present two PI-ADMM algorithms in Section III. The conver-
gence and privacy analyses regarding proposed approaches are
presented in Section IV. To validate the efficiency of proposed
methods, we provide numerical experiments in Section V.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. INCREMENTAL ADMM
By defining x = [x1, ..., xN ] ∈ RpN , problem (1) can be
rewritten as
min
x,z
N∑
i=1
fi(xi;Di), s.t . 1 ⊗ z − x = 0, (2)
where z ∈ Rp , 1 = [1, ..., 1] ∈ RN , and ⊗ is Kronecker
product. For simplicity, we denote fi(xi;Di) as fi(xi). The
augmented Lagrangian for problem (2) is
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Fig. 1. An example of I-ADMM with an external eavesdropper.
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Fig. 2. Updating process of I-ADMM for example in Fig. 1 with iterations
[6n, 6n + 5] where n ∈ N.
Lρ(x, y, z) =
N∑
i=1
fi(xi)+〈y,1 ⊗ z − x〉+ ρ2 ‖1 ⊗ z − x‖
2 , (3)
where y = [y1, ..., yN ] ∈ RpN is the dual variable, while ρ >
0 is a constant parameter. Following W-ADMM [17], with
guaranteeing
∑N
i=1(x0i −
y0i
ρ ) = 0, the updates of x, y and z at
the (k + 1)-th iteration are given by
xk+1i :=

argmin
xi
fi(xi) + ρ2
zk − xi + ykiρ
2 , i = ik ;
xki , i ∈ V, i , ik ;
(4a)
yk+1i :=

yki + ρ
(
zk − xk+1i
)
, i = ik ;
yki , i ∈ V, i , ik ;
(4b)
zk+1 :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
xk+1i −
yk+1i
ρ
)
. (4c)
Note that the updates (4a)-(4c) are not decentralized since (4c)
collects information from all agents. With initializing x0 = 0
and y0 = 0, it is easy to verify that the update of z can be
incrementally implemented as
zk+1 = zk +
1
N
[(
xk+1ik −
yk+1ik
ρ
)
−
(
xkik −
ykik
ρ
)]
. (5)
Then the decentralized implementation of I-WADMM is pre-
sented in Algorithm 1. Different from W-ADMM, the agents
are activated in a predetermined circulant pattern for I-ADMM,
Algorithm 1: I-ADMM
1: initialize: {z0 = 0, x0i = 0, y0i = 0, k = 0|i ∈ V};
2: for k = 0, 1, ... do
3: agent ik = k mod N + 1 do:
4: receive token zk ;
5: update xk+1 according to (4a);
6: update yk+1 according to (4b);
7: update zk+1 according to (5);
8: send token zk+1 to agent ik+1 = k mod N + 2;
9: end for
where the activated agent in the k-th iteration is i = k
mod N + 1. Furthermore, we assume walk 〈ik〉k≥0 repeats a
Hamiltonian cycle order: 1→ 2→ · · · → N → 1→ 2→ · · ·
as WPG [11]. In I-ADMM, the variable zk+1 gets updated at
agent ik and passed as a token to its neighbor ik+1 through
Hamiltonian cycle. In Fig. 2, we present the evolution of
{xi, yi} at agents and the transition of token z when I-ADMM
is applied to the example shown in Fig. 1.
A. Convergence Analysis
To start with the convergence analysis for I-ADMM, we
first make the following assumptions over network G and local
functions { fi}. For simplicity, we denote F(x) = ∑Ni=1 fi(xi).
Assumption 1. Graph G is well connected and there exists a
Hamiltonian cycle.
Assumption 2. The objective function F(x) is bounded from
below over x, and F(x) is coercive over x. Each fi(x) is L-
Lipschitz differentiable, i.e., for any u, v ∈ Rp ,
‖∇ fi(u) − ∇ fi(v)‖ ≤ L ‖u − v‖ , i = 1, ..., N . (6)
With Assumption 2, we obtain the following useful inequal-
ity for loss function fi .
Lemma 1. For any u, v ∈ Rp , we have
fi(u) ≤ fi(v) + 〈∇ fi(v), u − v〉 + L2 ‖u − v‖
2. (7)
Proof. Inequality (7) is well known, see [41]. 
Then according to Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 in [17], we
have the following convergence property for I-ADMM.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for ρ ≥ 2L + 2,
the iterations (xk, yk, zk) generated by I-ADMM satisfy the
following properties:
1) Lρ(xk, yk, zk) − Lρ(xk+1, yk+1, zk+1) ≥ 0;
2) 〈Lρ(xk, yk, zk)〉k≥0 is lower bounded and convergent;
3) lim
k→∞
∇Lρ(xk, yk, zk) = 0.
Proof. The convergence proof of I-ADMM is similar to that
of W-ADMM in [17]. The difference is that as Assumption 1
in [17], each agent is visited with a fixed period, i.e. J(δ) =
N . 
4B. Computation Efficient I-ADMM
With complex local function fi , the computation load for
solving minimization problem (4a) is high. To alleviate com-
putation burden for the update of xk+1 in I-ADMM, we can
apply the first-order approximation by replacing (4a) with
update:
xk+1i :=

zk +
yki
ρ
− 1
ρ
∇ fi
(
xki
)
, i = ik ;
xki , i ∈ V, i , ik .
(8)
Comparing to (4a), update process (8) can save computation.
However, it may cause higher communication loads to achieve
the same accuracy, as shown in [42]. In what follows, we
will focus on investigating the privacy preserving I-ADMM
based on Algorithm 1. Besides, the obtained results can also
be extended to the computation efficient I-ADMM methods
with privacy preservation.
III. INCREMENTAL ADMM WITH PRIVACY PRESERVATION
In this section, we will first analyze the privacy of Algorithm
1. Then to guarantee the security for agents in solving (2), we
propose the PI-ADMM algorithms.
A. Review of I-ADMM
Assume that there exists an external eavesdropper over-
hearing all the links, as shown in Fig. 1. While the agents
want to protect their private functions and datasets from the
eavesdropper. The privacy property of I-ADMM is analyzed
as follows.
Lemma 3. In Algorithm 1, the intermediate states and gradi-
ents {xk+1i , yk+1i ,∇ fi(xk+1i )|i ∈ V, k = 0, 1, ...} can be inferred
by the eavesdropper.
Proof. Assume that the eavesdropper has the knowledge of
xkik and y
k
ik
where k ≥ 0. Through the update process (4a), the
eavesdropper can establish the following equations
∇ fik
(
xk+1ik
)
= yk+1ik . (9)
Hence once yk+1ik is inferred by the master, ∇ fik (xk+1ik ) will be
revealed as well. Combining the update process (4b) and (5),
we have 
yk+1ik = y
k
ik
+ ρ
(
zk − xk+1ik
)
;
∆k+1 =
1
N
[(
xk+1ik −
yk+1ik
ρ
)
−
(
xkik −
ykik
ρ
)]
,
(10)
where ∆k+1 = zk+1 − zk . Through rearranging (10), the
recursive equations are given by
xk+1ik =
1
2
(
N∆k+1 + zk + xkik
)
;
yk+1ik =y
k
ik
+
ρ
2
(
zk − N∆k+1 − xkik
)
,
(11)
Since the eavesdropper also overhears zk+1 and zk , (11) con-
sists of 2 equations with 2 variables. Hence xk+1ik and y
k+1
ik
can
Algorithm 2: I-ADMM with Random Initialization
1: initialize: z1 = 0;
2: for k = 0, ..., N − 1 do
3: agent i = k mod N + 1 do:
4: generate υ ∈ Rp randomly;
5: set x0i ← υ and y0i ← −ρυ;
6: end for
7: run steps 2-9 of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 3: PI-ADMM1 with Step Size Perturbation
1: Follow steps of Algorithm 2, but substitute steps 6 and 7
of Algorithm 1 with the following 4 steps;
2: generate γkik ∼ Pik ;
3: set ρ˜kik ← ρ · γkik ;
4: update xk+1 by
xk+1i :=

argmin
xi
fi(xi) +
ρ˜ki
2
zk − xi + ykiρ˜ki
2 , i = ik ;
xki , o.w.;
(12)
5: update yk+1 by
yk+1i :=

yki + ρ˜
k
i
(
zk − xk+1i
)
, i = ik ;
yki , o.w..
(13)
be obtained by solving (11). In I-ADMM, since {x0i , y0i |i ∈ V}
are known to the eavesdropper, with (9) and the update (4a),
(4b), we can conclude that {xki , yki ,∇ fi(xki )|i ∈ V, k = 0, 1, ...}
can also be inferred. 
In addition, with {∇ fi(xki )|i ∈ V, k = 0, 1, ...}, the private
functions { fi} can be inferred by the eavesdropper [33].
B. Privacy-preserving I-ADMM
Inspired by the privacy-preservation definitions in [33], [43],
[44], we define the privacy as follows.
Definition 1. A mechanism M :M(X) → Y is defined to be
privacy preserving if the input X cannot be uniquely derived
from the output Y.
Hence from Lemma 1, I-ADMM is not privacy preserving.
Recalling the proof of Lemma 3, by making x0i and y
0
i private,
information {xki , yki ,∇ fi(xki )|k = 0, 1, ...} cannot be inferred by
the eavesdropper exactly from the recursive equation (11) if
the states and multipliers are unknown at the end of iteration.
In fact, to implement the incremental update (5), we only need
to ensure
∑N
i=1(x0i −
y0i
ρ ) = 0. To introduce uncertainty, we
randomize the initialization and present Algorithm 2, where
variables x0i and y
0
i are randomly generated at agent i such
that (4c) is satisfied. Then Algorithm 1 is carried out with
initialization {x0i = υ, y0i = −ρυ |i ∈ V}.
To enhance the privacy of Algorithm 2, we can introduce
more uncertainty by applying perturbation on primal and
5Algorithm 4: PI-ADMM2 with Primal Perturbation
1: Follow steps of Algorithm 2, but substitute step 5 of
Algorithm 1 with the following two steps;
2: generate ωkik ∼ N(0, σ);
3: update xk+1 by
xk+1i :=

argmin
xi
fi(xi) + ρ2
zk − xi + ykiρ
2 + ωki , i = ik ;
xki , o.w..
(14)
dual updates. Through substituting the update of primal and
dual variables with (12) and (13), respectively, where the
step size ρ is multiplied by a perturbation γkik , we can
obtain the PI-ADMM1 in Algorithm 3. It is worth noting
that (13) can be regarded as introducing additive noise, i.e.,
ρ(γkik−1)(zk+1−xk+1ik ), over the dual variable updating, which is
scaled by the primal residue. Regarding to the primal update
with the first order approximation, it can also be expressed
as appending the scaled noise 1ρ ( 1γkik
− 1)(ykik −∇ fik (xkik )) over
xk+1ik . Different from existing ADMM based privacy-preserving
methods [29], [33], we randomly generate initialization in PI-
ADMM1 instead of implementing encryption for each itera-
tion. Thus, the computation complexity and communication
load of PI-ADMM1 are significantly reduced. In addition, the
applied perturbation mechanism avoids computation over step
size ρ as Algorithm 1 in [33].
From the results of [29], another approach to enhance the
privacy of PI-ADMM1 is perturbing the primal updates by
adding noise according to fixed stochastic, which is illustrated
in Algorithm 4. For the k-th iteration, an artificial noise
ωkik generated at agent ik locally is affiliated over x
k+1
ik
.
From the analyses in [29], this perturbation mechanism can
also guarantee the privacy for agents. However, due to page
limitation, we only evaluate the convergence property for PI-
ADMM2 in Section V.
IV. CONVERGENCE AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will first prove the convergence for PI-
ADMM1 and PI-ADMM2. Then privacy analysis is provided.
A. Convergence Analysis
We first show the convergence of Algorithm 2.
Remark 1. Algorithm 2 has the same convergence properties
as those of I-ADMM.
Proof. Since
∑N
i=1(xi− yiρ ) = 0 is guaranteed from steps 2-6 in
Algorithm 2, the convergence can be proved as Lemma 2. 
Denoting x∗ = argminx F(x), then with Assumption 2, The
convergence properties of PI-ADMM1 is provided as follows.
Lemma 4. With the following conditions
ρ > L; (15a)
γkik > max
{
2ρ2 + 4ρ + 1
ρ − L , 2(ρ + 2)N
}
, k = 0, 1, ..., (15b)
the iterations (xk, yk, zk) generated by PI-ADMM1 satisfy the
following properties:
1) Lρ(xk, yk, zk) − Lρ(xk+1, yk+1, zk+1) ≥ 0;
2) 〈Lρ(xk, yk, zk)〉k≥0 is lower bounded by optimum F(x∗)
and convergent;
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Based on the analysis of Lemma 4 for PI-ADMM1, the
convergence property is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Following Assumptions 1 and 2, and the condi-
tions given in Lemma 4, the iteration (xk, yk, zk) generated
by PI-ADMM1 have limit points, which satisfy the KKT
conditions of problem (2).
Proof. See Appendix B. 
It should be noted that the conditions given in Lemma 4 and
Theorem 1 is sufficient for the convergence of PI-ADMM1.
B. Privacy Analysis
In what follows, we will analyze the privacy property for
Algorithm 2 and PI-ADMM1.
Remark 2. In Algorithm 2, the states, multipliers and gra-
dients, i.e. {xk+1ik , yk+1ik ,∇ fik (xk+1ik )|i ∈ N, k = 0, ...,K}, cannot
be inferred by the eavesdropper exactly if zk+1 , xk+1ik for all
k = 0, ...K .
Proof. Assume that the eavesdropper collects information
from K iterations to infer the information of agents. According
to (11), the measurements considering all the agents can be
formulated as
x0i −
y0i
ρ
= 0, i ∈ V;
x1i0 =
1
2
(
N∆1 + z0 + x0i0
)
;
y1i0 = y
0
i0
+
ρ
2
(
z0 − N∆1 − x0i0
)
;
...
xK+1iK =
1
2
(
N∆K+1 + zK + xKiK
)
;
yK+1iK = y
K
iK
+
ρ
2
(
zK − N∆K+1 − xKiK
)
.
(16)
In (16), {zk |k = 0, ...,K} are known to the eavesdropper, while
{xkik , ykik , xk+1ik , yk+1ik |k = 0, ...,K} are unknown variables to the
eavesdropper. Thus, (16) consists of 2K + 3 equations and
2K+2N+2 unknown variables. Since N > 2, the eavesdropper
cannot solve (16) to infer the exact values of {xki , yki |i ∈ V, k =
0, ...,K}. Hence with (9), the gradients {∇ fi(xk+1i )|i ∈ V, k =
0, ...,K} cannot be inferred exactly by the eavesdropper either.

6The consensus happens when Algorithm 2 converges, where
z coincides with local variables {xi}. Hence the eavesdropper
can use z to infer {xi}. However, with finite iterations, the
gap between token z and states {xi} can only be guaranteed
within a threshold 1. Denote xˆi as the measurement of the
eavesdropper regarding to xi . According to (11), once xK+1iK
is measured, all the states {xkiK |k = 0, ...,K} of agent iK can
also be estimated sequentially.
Remark 3. Assume that the eavesdropper uses zK+1 to infer
xK+1iK of agent iK = K mod N+1. If ‖zK+1− xK+1iK ‖ <  , there
exists an error bound for measurement (16) asxˆkiK − xkiK  < 2n, yˆkiK − ykiK  < ρ (2 b KN c+1 − 2n) , (17)
where k ∈ [K − nN + 1,K − (n − 1)N], 1 ≤ n ≤ b KN c.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Remark 4. In Algorithm 2, the primal and dual variables,
and gradients, i.e., {xki , yki ,∇ fi(xki )|i ∈ V, k = 0, ...,K}, can
be inferred by the eavesdropper asymptoticly, i.e., K →∞.
Proof. According to [17], it is guaranteed that limK→∞ zK =
xKi , ∀i ∈ V. Furthermore, with equation (11) and condition
x0i −
y0i
ρ = 0, the values {xki , yki |k = 0, ...,K} can be derived
recursively. Due to (9), the gradients {∇ fi(xki )|k = 0, ...,K} is
revealed. 
As for PI-ADMM1, due to introduced randomization on the
update of dual variable, it can guarantee augmented privacy
preservation.
Theorem 2. In PI-ADMM1, the exact states {xki |i ∈ V, k =
0, 1, ...} cannot be inferred by the eavesdropper unless zk+1 =
xk+1ik holds. The multipliers and gradients {yki ,∇ fi(xki )|i ∈N, k = 0, 1, ...} cannot be exactly inferred either.
Proof. Due to the randomized initialization, the values of x0i
and y0i cannot be revealed by the eavesdropper. Assume that
the eavesdropper collects information from K iterations to
infer the information of agents. The measurements considering
all the agents can be formulated as
x0i −
y0i
ρ
= 0, i ∈ V;
x1i0 =
1
1 + γ0i0
(
N∆1 + γ0i0 z
0 + x0i0
)
;
y1i0 = y
0
i0
+
ργ0i0
1 + γ0i0
(
z0 − N∆1 − x0i0
)
;
...
xK+1iK =
1
1 + γKiK
(
N∆K+1 + γKiK z
K + xKiK
)
;
yK+1iK = y
K
iK
+
ργKiK
1 + γKiK
(
zK − N∆K+1 − xKiK
)
.
(18)
Different form (16), in the above equations, the tokens
{zk+1 |k = 0, ...,K + 1} are known to the eavesdropper, while
1 can be a predetermined stopping criterion for Algorithm 2.
{xkik , ykik |k = 0, ...,K + 1} and {γkik |k = 0, ...,K} are unknown
variables. Thus, (18) consists of 2K+N+2 equations and 3K+
2N+3 unknown variables. Thus the eavesdropper cannot solve
(18) to infer the exact values of {xki , yki |i ∈ V, k = 0, ...,K}
since K+N+1 > 0. When K →∞, the eavesdropper can have
another piece of information according to the KKT conditions
(33). However, due to K  N , the under-determined system
(18) still cannot be solved asymptotically. 
Corollary 1. In PI-ADMM1, the local functions { fi |i ∈ V}
cannot be inferred by the eavesdropper.
Proof. According to Theorem 2, the states and corresponding
gradients are unknown to the eavesdropper. Hence from [33],
the local objective functions { fi} of agents cannot be inferred
by the eavesdropper. 
From above analysis, we can conclude that the proposed
PI-ADMM1 is privacy-preserving for the local functions and
datasets of agents against the external eavesdropper. In addi-
tion, the privacy for agent i can also be guaranteed against
other agents.
Theorem 3. In PI-ADMM1, the states, multipliers and gradi-
ents of agent i(∈ V), i.e., {xki , yki ,∇ fi(xki )|k = 0, 1, ...}, cannot
be inferred by other N − 1 colluding agents.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider the privacy
for agent i0 against other agents in set V\i0, which contains
all agents except i0. Recalling the measurements (18), useful
information for deducing the primal and dual variables, and
gradients is given by
x0i0 −
y0i0
ρ
= 0;
x1+nNi0 =
1
1 + γnNi0
(
N∆1+nN + γnNi0 z
nN + xnNi0
)
;
y1+nNi0 = y
nN
i0
+
ργnNi0
1 + γnNi0
(
znN − N∆1+nN − xnNi0
)
,
(19)
where n is from 0 to b KN c. Since (19) contains 2b KN c + 3
equations and 3b KN c + 5 unknown variables, the remaining
agents cannot obtain the exact values of {xki0, yki0,∇ fi0 (xki0 )|k =
0, ...,K} by solving this under-determined system. With K →
∞, the KKT conditions reduce to
∇ fi0 (xK+1i0 ) = yK+1i0 ; yK+1i0 =
∑
j∈V\i0
yK+1j ; z
K+1 = xK+1i0 . (20)
However, even combining (19) and (20), the exact values of
{xki0, yki0,∇ fi0 (xki0 )|k = 0, ...,K} cannot be obtained asymptoti-
cally. 
Since only the token is transmitted among agents in PI-
ADMM1, the local variables and gradients {xki0, yki0,∇ fi0 (xki0 )}
of agent i0 cannot be observed by other agents directly. In fact,
except {xkj , ykj ,∇ fj(xkj )| j ∈ V\i0}, the information gathered
by the eavesdropper is the same as that of colluding agents in
V\i0. This explains why the system (18) reduces to (19) in
Theorem 3.
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Fig. 3. The accuracy of decentralized ridge regression for W-ADMM (β =
10), IPW-ADMM (ρ = 1, τ = 0, M = 25), COCA (c = 1, α = 1, ρ = 0.85), I-
ADMM (ρ = 10), PI-ADMM1 (ρ = 10) and PI-ADMM2 (ρ = 10, σ = 10−3)
with different network settings: (a) N = 100, η = 0.3; (b) N = 100, η = 0.5;
(c) N = 200, η = 0.3.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we will conduct numerical experiments to
evaluate the convergence and privacy properties of proposed
PI-ADMM algorithms. For the simulation, we generate the
connected network G with N agents and |E | = N (N−1)2 η links.
This ensures a Hamiltonian cycle in G. We consider unicast
among agents, and the resultant communication cost for each
transmission of a p-dimensional vector is 1 unit.
We evaluate the convergence of proposed approaches with
state-of-the-art approaches regarding the accuracy defined by
accuracy =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xki − x∗x0i − x∗ , (21)
where x∗ ∈ Rp is the optimal solution of (2). The dimension
of xi , yi and z is set to be p = 2.
A. Decentralized Ridge Regression
We first consider the decentralized least square problem as
[45], which aims at solving (1) with a local function
fi(xi;Di) = 1bi
bi∑
j=1
xTi oi, j − ti, j2 , (22)
where Di = {oi, j, ti, j | j = 1, ..., bi} is the dataset of agent i
locally. The entries of input oi, j ∈ R2 and target ti, j ∈ R
follow i.i.d. distribution U(0, 1). The number of data samples
is kept unique across agents with bi = 30.
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Fig. 4. The estimation and true value in decentralized ridge regression with
respect to {xk1 (1), yk1 (1) |k = 0, 1, ..., 2000} for I-ADMM, PI-ADMM1 and
PI-ADMM2.
The accuracy over communication cost is shown in Fig.
2. It is clear that I-ADMM is the most communication
efficient compared with W-ADMM [17], IPW-ADMM [18]
and COCA [20] for different network settings. Equivalently,
it demonstrates that I-ADMM has a faster convergence speed
than W-ADMM. This is due to that both I-ADMM and W-
ADMM consume the same communication load with same
amount of iterations. The update order of I-ADMM follows
Hamiltonian cycle, while W-ADMM is updated by a random
walk. In W-ADMM, each agent is randomly visited, and thus
the unbalanced updating frequency of agents degrades the
convergence speed. It also can be demonstrated that I-ADMM
is more communication efficient than W-ADMM. Besides, PI-
ADMM1 presents different convergence behaviors compared
with I-ADMM and W-ADMM. To guarantee the privacy in
PI-ADMM1, we set {Pi = U(1 − 1ρ, 1 + 1ρ )|i ∈ V}, and
generate {x0i ∼ U(0, 100)|i ∈ V}, which hence makes the
initialization {x0i } far away from the optimal solution x∗.
This explains the phenomenon that PI-ADMM1 converges
slower than I-ADMM and W-ADMM with few iterations.
However, along with the updating process, the convergence
speed of PI-ADMM1 surpasses that of W-ADMM, which
coincides with that of I-ADMM. This is because the artificial
noise added on the step size is scaled by the primal residue
zk+1− xk+1i , which converges to 0 gradually. Since the additive
noise in PI-ADMM2 does not scale with iterations. As shown
in Fig. 4, this introduces error bounds for the accuracy,
which is determined by σ. Comparing sub-figures (a) and
(b), the convergence behaviors of I-ADMM, PI-ADMM1 and
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Fig. 5. The accuracy of decentralized logistic regression for W-ADMM (β =
1), IPW-ADMM (ρ = 1, τ = 3, M = 25), COCA (c = 1, α = 1, ρ = 0.85),
I-ADMM (ρ = 1), PI-ADMM1 (ρ = 1) and PI-ADMM2 (ρ = 1, σ = 10−3)
with different network settings: (a) N = 100, η = 0.3; (b) N = 100, η = 0.5;
(c) N = 200, η = 0.3.
PI-ADMM2 do not depend on the connectivity η. This is
because the convergence property of these proposed algorithms
is only determined by the size of Hamiltonian cycle. This
also explains that the convergence speed degrades with the
expanding networks.
Then we evaluate the capability of privacy preservation for
proposed PI-ADMM algorithms with N = 100 and η = 0.3.
Without loss of generality, we only focus on the estima-
tion over {xk1 (1), yk1 (1)|k = 0, 1, ..., 2000} with observations{zk |k = 0, 1, ..., 2001} for proposed methods. Besides, as
for I-ADMM, we assume that the eavesdropper uses the
recursive equation (11) to deduce the primal and dual variable
of agent 1 with initialization {xi = 0, yi = 0| ∈ V} and
inferring x2001i2000 with z
2001. The results are shown in Fig. 6
(a) and (b), where the estimation coincides with the true
value. The figures clearly demonstrates that I-ADMM is not
privacy preserving. While for PI-ADMM1, we reformulate
the under-determined equations (18) into the form Aυ = b,
where υ = [x01(1), ..., x20001 (1), y01(1), ..., y20001 (1)]. A ∈ Rl×m is
the coefficient matrix that also considers the KKT condition
(33) as
∑N
i=1 y
2000
i (1) = 0. Since {γkik } is unknown to the
eavesdropper, we set γkik = 1 in the estimation without loss
of generality. Moreover, we substitute x2001−ii2000−i with z
2001−i for
i = 0, 1, ..., N − 1 both in systems (16) and (18). Since A is
sparse and l > m, we use core function lsqr(A, b) in matlab to
obtain the solution υ∗, which solves the least square problem
υ∗ = argmin
υ
‖Aυ − b‖2. (23)
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Fig. 6. The estimation and true value in decentralized logistic regression
with respect to {xk1 (1), yk1 (1) |k = 0, 1, ...2000} for I-ADMM, PI-ADMM1
and PI-ADMM2.
A similar procedure for estimation can also be established
for PI-ADMM2. The estimation results for PI-ADMM1 and
PI-ADMM2 are presented in Fig. 6 (c)-(f). From sub-figures
(c) and (e), for both PI-ADMM1 and PI-ADMM2, the gaps
between the true value and estimation for xk1 (1) shrinkages to 0
as convergence happens. This is inevitable and also consistent
with analysis in Remark 4. However, the estimation error for
yk1 (1) diverges with iterations. We can see that PI-ADMM1
and PI-ADMM2 can prevent information leakage against the
external eavesdropper regarding to the multipliers.
B. Decentralized Logistic Regression
In the decentralized logistic regression, the local loss func-
tion of agent i is
fi(xi) = 1bi
bi∑
j=1
log
(
1 + exp
(
−ti, j xTi oi, j
))
, (24)
where ti, j ∈ {−1, 1} and bi = 30. Each sample feature oi, j
follows N(0, I). To generate ti, j , we first generate a random
vector x ∈ R2 ∼ N(0, I). Then for each sample, we generate
vi, j according to U(0, 1), and if vi, j ≤ (1 + exp(−xT oi, j))−1,
we set ti, j as 1, otherwise −1. Since it is difficult to solve
the optimization problem (2) with (24) in I-ADMM based
methods, we alternatively use the updating process (8). Fairly,
we also adopt the first-order approximation for algorithms
IPW-ADMM, W-ADMM and COCA.
In Fig. 5, we present the accuracy over communication costs
for different network settings. Apparently, compared to W-
ADMM, IPW-ADMM and COCA, the proposed I-ADMM
9based algorithms are the most communication-efficient. The
curves with different network setups present the similar trends
as those of Fig. 3.
The results regarding to privacy preservation are shown in
Fig. 6. For PI-ADMM1 and PI-ADMM2, we set {Pi = U(1−
0.1
ρ , 1 +
0.1
ρ )|i ∈ V} and initialize {x0i ∼ U(0, 10)|i ∈ V}.
The estimation approaches for I-ADMM, PI-ADMM1 and PI-
ADMM2 follow those of Fig. 4. In Fig. 6, the sub-figures (a)
and (b) demonstrate that I-ADMM cannot guarantee privacy
for agents. As for PI-ADMM1 and PI-ADMM2, the states
xk1 (1) can be revealed with iteration k increasing. However,
the estimation for yk1 (1) diverges from the ground truth. Thus,
proposed PI-ADMM algorithms are privacy preserving.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We investigate the I-ADMM based privacy preserving meth-
ods for solving consensus problem in decentralized networks.
Different from W-ADMM, the updating order of I-ADMM
follows an Hamiltonian cycle, that guarantees a faster con-
vergence speed than W-ADMM. Since fewer iteration rounds
are needed, I-ADMM is more communication efficient than
W-ADMM and other state-of-the-art methods. Moreover, to
prevent information leakage over the local function and private
dataset against the external eavesdropper, we propose two PI-
ADMM algorithms, i.e., PI-ADMM1 and PI-ADMM2, which
conduct step size perturbation and primal perturbation, respec-
tively. We prove the convergence and privacy preservation
for PI-ADMM1. Numerical experiments also show that PI-
ADMM2 is privacy preserving. Besides, numerical results
show that PI-ADMM1 can achieve almost the same commu-
nication efficiency as I-ADMM.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
From steps 2-11 of PI-ADMM1, it is easy to verify that
1
N
∑N
i=1(x0i −
y0i
ρ ) = 0. Then we prove that Lρ(xk, yk, zk) is
non-increasing with iteration k. From the optimality condition
of (4a) and update (13), we can derive
∇ fik
(
xk+1ik
)
=ykik + ργ
k
ik
(
zk − xk+1ik
)
= yk+1ik . (25)
After updating to xk+1 and yk+1 by (4c), (13), we have
Lρ
(
xk, yk, zk
)
− Lρ
(
xk+1, yk+1, zk
)
(a)
= fik
(
xkik
)
− fik
(
xk+1ik
)
A
+
〈
ykik , z
k − xkik
〉
−
〈
yk+1ik , z
k − xk+1ik
〉
+
〈
ρ
(
zk − xk+1ik
)
, xk+1ik − xkik
〉
B
+
ρ
2
xkik − xk+1ik 2 ,
(26)
where (a) holds since the cosine identity ‖b+ c‖2− ‖a+ c‖2 =
‖b − a‖2 + 2〈a + c, b − a〉. According to Lemma 1, term A in
(26) satisfies
A ≥
〈
∇ fik
(
xkik
)
, xkik − xk+1ik
〉
− L
2
xk+1ik − xkik 2
=
〈
ykik , x
k
ik
− xk+1ik
〉
− L
2
xk+1ik − xkik 2 , (27)
Then A + B can be rewritten as
A + B
(a)
=
〈
ykik − yk+1ik , zk − xk+1ik
〉
+
1
γkik
〈
yk+1ik − ykik , xk+1ik − xkik
〉
(b)≥ − 1
γkik
(
1
ρ
+
1
2
) yk+1ik − ykik 2 − ( 12γkik + L2
) xk+1ik − xkik 2 ,
(28)
where (a) is because (29) and (b) are from Young’s inequality.
ρ
(
zk − xk+1ik
)
=
1
γkik
(
yk+1ik − ykik
)
. (29)
Through updating token z at iteration k, the change of aug-
mented Lagrangian is measured by
Lρ
(
xk+1, yk+1, zk
)
− Lρ
(
xk+1, yk+1, zk+1
)
=
N∑
i=1
[ 〈
yk+1i , z
k − zk+1〉
+
ρ
2
(zk − xk+1i 2 − zk+1 − xk+1i 2)]
=
ρN
2
zk+1 − zk2 + N∑
i=1
ρ
〈
zk+1 − xk+1i +
yk+1i
ρ
, zk − zk+1
〉
(a)
=
ρN
2
zk+1 − zk2 ,
(30)
where (a) holds because the truth zk+1 = 1N
∑N
i=1(xk+1i −
yk+1i
ρ ).
By combining (26) and (30), we obtain
Lρ
(
xk, yk, zk
)
− Lρ
(
xk+1, yk+1, zk+1
)
=
(
ρ − L
2
− 1
2γkik
) xkik − xk+1ik 2 + ρN2 zk+1 − zk2
− 1
γkik
(
1
ρ
+
1
2
) yk+1ik − ykik 2
(a)≥ ρN
(
1
2
− ρN + 2N
γkik
) zk+1 − zk2
+
(
ρ − L
2
− 1
2γkik
− ρ
2 + 2ρ
γkik
) xk+1ik − xkik 2 ,
(31)
where (a) is from yk+1ik − ykik = ρ(xk+1ik − xkik ) − ρN(zk+1 − zk)
and triangle inequality. Hence to ensure that Lρ(xk, yk, zk)
is non-increasing with iterations, we must have ρ > L and
γkik > max{
2ρ2+4ρ+1
ρ−L , 2(ρ + 2)N}. This proves property 1). To
prove statement 2), we verify that Lρ(xk+1, yk+1, zk+1) is lower
bounded.
Lρ
(
xk+1, yk+1, zk+1
)
=
N−1∑
j=0
[
fik− j
(
xk−j+1ik− j
)
+
〈
y
k−j+1
ik− j , z
k+1 − xk−j+1ik− j
〉
+
ρ
2
zk+1 − xk−j+1ik− j 2]
(a)≥
N−1∑
j=0
[
fik− j
(
zk+1
)
+
ρ − L
2
zk+1 − xk−j+1ik− j 2
10
−
〈
∇ fik− j
(
xk−j+1ik− j
)
− yk−j+1ik− j , z
k+1 − xk−j+1ik− j
〉]
≥min
x
{
N∑
i=1
fi(x)
}
+
ρ − L
2
N−1∑
j=0
zk+1 − xk−j+1ik− j 2
(b)≥ F(x∗) > −∞, (32)
where (a) is from L-Lipschitz differentiable fi and (b) is from
the Assumption 2 in which the optimal value F(x∗) is assumed
to be lower bounded. Guaranteeing ρ > L can make (32)
satisfied, which completes the proof for property 2). Then
with the monotonicity statement 1), we conclude that Lρ is
convergent.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Note that the KKT point (x∗, y∗, z∗) of problem (2) satisfies
the following conditions
∇ fi
(
x∗i
) − y∗i = 0, ∀i ∈ V; (33a)
N∑
i=1
y∗i = 0; (33b)
z∗ = x∗i , ∀i ∈ V . (33c)
Since (33) also implies that
∑N
i=1 ∇ fi(x∗i ) = 0, x∗ is also a
stationary point of problem (2). By summing (31) from all
iterations 0 to k, we obtain
k∑
l=0
[
ρN
(
1
2
− ρN + 2N
γlil
) zl+1 − zl2
+
(
ρ − L
2
− 1
2γlil
− ρ
2 + 2ρ
γlil
) xl+1il − xlil 2]
≤Lρ
(
x0, y0, z0
)
− Lρ
(
xk+1, yk+1, zk+1
)
=
[
Lρ
(
x0, y0, z0
)
− F(x∗)
]
−
[
Lρ
(
xk+1, yk+1, zk+1
)
− F(x∗)
]
(a)≤Lρ
(
x0, y0, z0
)
− F(x∗) < +∞,
(34)
where (a) is from (32). Then with the conditions ρ > L and
γkik > max{
2ρ2+4ρ+1
ρ−L , 2(ρ + 2)N}, the left hand side (LHS) of
inequality (34) is positive and increasing with k. Since the
RHS of (34) is finite, the iterates (xk, yk, zk) must satisfy,
lim
k→∞
zk+1 − zk = 0; lim
k→∞
xk+1i − xki  = 0, ∀i ∈ V . (35)
In addition, from the inequality of (28), the dual residue is
given by limk→∞ ‖yk+1ik −ykik ‖ ≤ limk→∞ ρ‖x
k+1
ik
−xkik ‖+ρN ‖zk+1−
zk ‖ = 0. Since ‖yk+1ik − ykik ‖ ≥ 0, we can conclude that
lim
k→∞
yk+1i − yki  = 0, ∀i ∈ V . (36)
Then we utilize (35) and (36) to show that the limit point of
(xk, yk, zk) is a KKT point of problem (2). For any i ∈ V,
there always exists a j ∈ [0, N − 1] satisfyingzk+1 − xk+1i  = zk − xk−j+1ik− j 
≤ zk+1 − zk−j + zk−j − xk−j+1ik− j 
(a)
=
zk+1 − zk−j + 1
ργ
k−j
ik− j
yk−j+1ik− j − yk−jik− j  ,
(37)
where (a) is from (29). Then we can conclude
lim
k→∞
zk+1 − xk+1i  = 0, ∀i ∈ V . (38)
By applying (4c) and (25), we obtain that
lim
k→∞
N∑
i=1
yki = 0; lim
k→∞
∇ fi(xki ) − yki = 0, ∀i ∈ V . (39)
Equations (38) and (39) imply that (xk, yk, zk) asymptotically
satisfy the KKT conditions in (33). Then we conclude that the
iterates (xk, yk, zk) in PI-ADMM1 have limit points, which
satisfy KKT conditions of original problem (2).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF REMARK 3
According to (4a), the states of agent iK satisfy
xK−nN+1iK = x
K−nN+2
iK
= ... = xK−(n−1)NiK , 1 ≤ n ≤
⌊
K
N
⌋
. (40)
Then from recursive equation (11), for k ∈ [K − nN + 1,K −
(n − 1)N], we have
xkiK =x
K−(n−1)N
iK
=2xK−(n−1)N+1iK − N∆K−(n−1)N+1 − zK−(n−1)N+1
=4xK−(n−2)N+1iK − 2N∆K−(n−1)N+1 − 2zK−(n−1)N+1
− N∆K−(n−2)N+1 − zK−(n−2)N+1
...
=2nxK+1iK −
n∑
j=1
(
2n−jN∆K−(n−j)N+1 − 2n−j zK−(n−j)N+1
)
.
(41)
By substituting xK+1iK with z
K+1 in (41), the measurement xˆkiK
is obtained. With the condition ‖zK+1 − xK+1iK ‖ <  , the LHS
of (17) is obtained. Since the eavesdropper cannot deduce
yKiK directly, instead y
k
iK
can be derived recursively from y0iK ,
where
ykiK =y
K−nN+1
iK
=yK−nNiK +
ρ
2
(
zK−nN − N∆K−nN+1 − xK−nNiK
)
...
=y0iK +
b KN c∑
j=n
ρ
2
(
zK−jN − N∆K−jN+1 − xK−jNiK
)
.
(42)
Due to y0iK = ρx
0
iK
and the bounds for measurement xˆkiK , the
final result is concluded.
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